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THE ORDINARY, THE EXCEPTIONAL, THE
CORRUPT, AND THE MORAL: WHAT DID
THE IMPEACHMENT OF BILL CLINTON
MEAN FOR AMERICA AND AMERICANS?
AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT
CLINTON. By Richard A. Posner 1 Harvard University
Press. 1999. Pp. 266. $24.95
Stephen B. Presser
Richard Posner is one of my heroes. I mean, the guy has
written 23 books, he's Chief Judge on the prestigious 7th Circuit
U.S. Court of Appeals, he was one of the most famous law professors at the University of Chicago, and if he didn't invent it, he
certainly did more to popularize law and economics than any
man alive. Perhaps it does not go too far to say that most late
twentieth century legal scholarship is really a dialogue with Posner, who has taken on virtually every trendy theory in the legal
academy, and found it wanting. 3 He is the foremost exponent of
practical reason in our time, and, for most practical purposes,
4
might be viewed as a latter-day Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. He
is a surprisingly self-effacing man in person, and, if you point out
all of his glorious accomplishments, and how much you hold him
in awe, he will explain that you are mistaken, that he is really
nothing special, as his wife has told him.5 Mrs. Posner not withI. Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Sen·
ior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School.
2. Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of
Law, and Adjunct Professor of Management and Strategy, Kellogg Graduate School of
Business, Northwestern University.
3. See generally Richard Posner, Overcoming Law (Harvard U. Press, 1995), and
Richard Posner, Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (Belknap Press of Harvard U.
Press, 1999).
4. Even to the point of editing a splendid collection of Holmes's writing: Richard
Posner, ed., The Essential Holmes (U. of Chicago Press, 1992).
5. You'll have to trust me on this, but he did say it to me when the two of us appeared on the radio program Extension 720, WGN Radio, September 29, 1999, to discuss
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standing, I do find Posner extraordinary. Trying to understand
how one person could produce so much, and so much of it of a
high caliber, the best I've been able to do is free associate on the
movies. Perhaps you can remember one of the final scenes in
Close Encounters of the Third Kind, when the aliens emerge out
of the giant flying saucer. There is one tall, bald alien in the center of them, who is obviously their leader, and who radiates serenity, bemusement, and intelligence. Could something similar
be the origin of Posner?
In any event, the task at hand is to review the latest from
the judge's laptop, by way of the Harvard University Press, his
new book on the impeachment of President Clinton. The
judge's prior qualities are very much in evidence here. The
learning is prodigious-Posner's analysis is informed by drawing
on Clausewitz's On War, (pp. 13, 148, 250) Shakespeare, (pp.
143, 254) Tolstoy, (p. 264), George Orwell on Salvador Dali, (p.
214) and the notion of "confirmation bias" from cognitive psychology, (p. 216) just to pick a few suggestive examples. The
perspective is, as always, Olympian in detachment, and the judge
has bon, or perhaps I should say mauvais, mots to hurl at virtually everyone involved in the impeachment imbroglio. The double-entendre in the title, An Affair of State, furnishes the judge
more than a little bit of sport, and it is sometimes difficult to tell
how seriously we are to take this tome. In the beginning of the
book is a list of "Dramatis Personae," (p. vii) many of whom are
barely referred to in the text which follows, and the metaphor of
drama is seldom pursued, leaving us to wonder whether Judge
Posner believes he is reviewing a comedy, a tragedy, or perhaps
a problem play. The judge pauses to explain the meaning of
such things as "phone sex" (a form of mutual masturbation, he
informs us, citing to the spicy work, VOX, which the President
and his nubile paramour, Ms. Lewinsky, shared, (pp. 18, 263))
while, some pages later, he excoriates Kenneth Starr for including so much salacious detail about a cigar in his famed Report.
(p.82)
The Judge seems critical of those who condemn fooling
around, and Posner is pleased that the "Affair of State" made
Americans much more realistic and open about sex. He appears
to applaud the fact that America, if it hasn't yet become France,
has at least moved closer to the kind of mature attitude Posner
himself manifested in his Rosenthal Lectures delivered at
Posner's book.
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Northwestern University, subsequently published as the book
Sex and Reason (1992). But there is often a disturbing dissonance about the judge's conclusions regarding the impeachment
proceedings. For example, while he states that "it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, on the basis of the public record as it
exists today, that President Clinton obstructed justice, in violation of federal criminal law, by (1) perjuring himself repeatedly
in his deposition in the Paula Jones case, in his testimony before
the grand jury, and in his responses to the questions put to him
by the House Judiciary Committee; (2) tampering with witness
Lewinsky by encouraging her to file a false affidavit in lieu of
having to be deposed, and to secrete the gifts that she had received from him; and (3) suborning perjury by suggesting to
Lewinsky that she include in her affidavit a false explanation for
the reason that she had been transferred from the White House
to the Pentagon,"6 (p. 54, footnote omitted) and while he concludes that the President's criminal conduct, were he anyone else
but the President, would have merited a federal sentence of imprisonment from 30 to 37 months, (p. 55) the Chief Judge is curiously of two minds about the impeachment itself.
Thus, in a crucial passage, which is also blurbed on the back
dust jacket of the book, Posner lays out what he claims to be two
feasible, and inconsistent, "narratives" of the circumstances that
led to the "Affair of State," and then reaches an impossible conclusion:
[I]n one, [of the two possible "narratives"] a reckless, lawless
immoral President commits a series of crimes in order to conceal a tawdry and shameful affair, crimes compounded by a
campaign of public lying and slanders. A prosecutor could
easily draw up a thirty-count indictment against the President.
In the other narrative, the confluence of a stupid law (the independent counsel law), a marginal lawsuit begotten and
nursed by political partisanship, a naive and imprudent judicial decision by the Supreme Court in that suit, and the irresistible human impulse to conceal one's sexual improprieties,
allows a trivial sexual escapade (what Clinton and Lewinskv

6. And that's not all, apparently. Posner adds that the President, "may also have
tampered with potential witness Currie, conspired to bribe Lewinsky with a job that
would secure her favorable testimony, and suborned perjury by Lewinsky by suggesting
that she include in her Paula Jones affidavit the 'delivering documents' cover story; but
these offenses cannot be proved with the degree of confidence required for a criminal
conviction." (p. 54). Nevertheless, according to Posner, "An imaginative prosecutor
could doubtless add counts of wire fraud, criminal contempt, the making of false statements to the government, and aiding and abetting a crime." (p. 54)
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called "fooling around" or "messing around") to balloon into
a grotesque and gratuitous constitutional drama. The problem is that both narratives are correct. (p. 92, footnote omitted)

But what if everyone but Posner believes that both narratives are not correct? I for, one, think the first narrative is true,
while the second is wishful thinking. Here we have what may
well be a demonstration of Posner's Olympian even-handedness
and serenity masking a preference for particular values. Perhaps
one can concede that the Independent Counsel law was "stupid"
or at least agree with the suddenly conventional wisdom that
Justice Scalia was right in his sole dissent to Morrison v. Olsen.1
Even so, I remain unconvinced that Paula Jones' lawsuit was
"marginal" or that the Supreme Court was "naive and imprudent" when it decided the suit could proceed while President
Clinton remained in office. I am not at all sure that the "human
impulse to conceal one's sexual improprieties," if one exists, is
"irresistible," nor, when the married leader of the free world is
repeatedly "fellated" (to use Judge Posner's marvelous past participle (p. 48)) in the Oval Office by a subordinate half his age,
and eventually on the government payroll, would I describe it as
a "trivial sexual escapade," "fooling," or "messing" around.
To take the last point first. Posner assures us that
"Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, [was] an affair intrinsically (that is, as long as it was secret) devoid of any significance
to anyone except Lewinsky[.]" (p. 13) But, even if the President
was as stunningly boorish as Posner exquisitely proves that he
was, wasn't the affair intrinsically significant to him, as well as
Lewinsky, to say nothing of its significance (even if undiscovered) for the President's relationship to his wife and daughter
and for the President's own purportedly expressed belief that his
conversations (up to and including the "phone sex" presumably)
were monitored by foreign governments, raising the possibility
of blackmail and international intrigue? Posner is able to draw a
distinction between public and private conduct and to argue that
if the majority of Americans weren't troubled by the President's
peccadilloes, neither should we be. But a number of us testified
before the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee's

7. It's been touched by the Greenhouse effect. See Linda Greenhouse, Blank
Check: Ethics in Government: The Price of Good Intentions, New York Times, Sec. 4, p. 1
(Feb. 1, 1998) ("After 10 years of mouldering on law library shelves, the Scalia dissent in
Morrison v. Olson is being cited and passed around in liberal circles like samizdat.").
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Subcommittee on the Constitution that the Framers, at least, had
a more holistic conception of integrity and virtue and would not
have drawn a sharp distinction between private acts and public
requirements. For them, virtue was paramount in the office of
President, and a President who twisted the law to serve his own
ends, as Posner admits this President did, would not have been
seen as fit to continue in office. George Washington, who took
the oath seriously, would have wanted Bill Clinton, to whom an
8
oath meant nothing, turned out of office.
Nor do I find Posner's other assertions-that the Paula
Jones' suit was "marginal" or that the Supreme Court was wrong
to allow it to go forward particularly persuasive. 9 Posner repeatedly describes Ms. Jones's lawsuit as one for "sexual harassment"-and one that was a "long shot" at best. (pp. 7, 13, 28, 91,
146, 218) It is true that the suit was eventually dismissed by
Judge Susan Weber Wright (p. 141) (a Bush appointee (p. 141),
but a Clinton law student, by the way, 10 which Posner does not
tell us), but it seems likely that Judge Wright's dismissal of the
lawsuit would have been reversed by the Eighth Circuit (as other
of her decisions regarding the lawsuit were). Judge Wright's
fining the President almost a hundred thousand dollars for contempt suggests that she at least took the lawsuit seriously, and, it
should be stressed, the lawsuit is properly seen not as about garden variety "sexual harassment," but rather about abuse of
power by the President when he was Governor. Posner never
explores the factual allegations of the Jones lawsuit, nor, it appears, has he studied the pleadings, because the suit was one for
a federal claim of abridging federal civil rights under cover of
law and for a state claim of intentional infliction of mental dis11
tress and defamation. Posner is convinced that Ms. Jones suf8. The hearings took place on November 9, 1998, before the House Judiciary
Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution. For the point about George Washington
see Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Impeached?, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 666 (1999). For similar arguments, sec Gary L.
McDowell, "High Crimes and Misdemeanors": Recovering the Intentions of the Founders,
67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 626 (1999); John 0. McGinnis, Impeachment: The Structural Understanding, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 650 (1999); and Jonathan Turley, Congress as Grand
Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. 735 (1999).
9. I should disclose that I was among the lawyers and academics who signed an
amicus brief on behalf of Mrs. Jones's position before the Supreme Court. We were right
then, and we're still right.
10. See, e.g., Joan I. Duffy, Clinton Hit with $90,686 Contempt Fine in Jones Case,
The Commercial Appeal (Memphis, TN) AI (July 30, 1999), available at 1999 WL
22119838.
II. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 686 (1997) ("Respondent seeks actual damages
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fered no real harm, (pp. 91, 149) but she claimed that she did,
she had voluminous evidence which raised the possibility that
Mr. Clinton's conduct toward her was replicated in his conduct
toward many other women, 12 and there were reports that the
reason the President initially refused to settle the Jones case was
his fear that many of those other women would similarly bring
suit against him. Can it really be true that Judge Posner believes
that the conduct of a Governor who (1) exposes himself to a
state employee, (2) urges her to kiss his revealed member, and
(3) has a burly state trooper (purportedly familiar with his
boss's proclivities) guarding the door and implicitly underscoring
the Governor's direction (implied threat?) to remain silent about
what happened is inconsequential?
Could it be that Judge Posner's own feelings about the danger of our becoming overexcited about sexual matters is driving
his analysis? Is he really "reasonable" where sex is concerned?
At one point Posner tells us that " ... seriously believing Christians (also seriously believing Jews and Muslims) are more likely
than other people to be outraged by sexual misconduct." (p. 66)
The implication appears to be that only the extremely religious
tend to get upset about sex, and the corollary is that realistic
pragmatists like him do not, but has his anti-prudishness made
him forget about some of the most important jurisprudential notions, or what our Country is supposed to be all about?
Judge Posner is admirably clear about where he stands.
"[N]ormative moral theory, and cognate forms of legal and political theory, have little to contribute to the public life of the nation," he tells us, in language that the framers would have found
shocking. 13 (p. 12) Referring to a couple of recent titanic national struggles, Posner explains that "American participation in
of $75,000 and punitive damages of $100,000. Her complaint contains four counts. The
first charges that petitioner, acting under color of state law, deprived her of rights protected by the Constitution, in violation of Rev. Stat.§ 1979,42 U.S.C. § 1983. The second
charges that petitioner and (former Arkansas state police officer Danny] Ferguson engaged in a conspiracy to violate her federal rights, also actionable under federal law. See
Rev. Stat.§ 1980,42 U.S.C. § 1985. The third is a state common-law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, grounded primarily on the incident at the hotel. The
fourth count, also based on state law, is for defamation, embracing both the comments
allegedly made to the press by Ferguson and the statements of petitioner's agents.)
12. Even Judge Posner repeats the "rumor" that the President regularly has sex
with subordinates. (p. 138)
13. For the case to the contrary, that is, for the argument that the framers believed,
and we should as well, that there could be no law without morality, and no morality
without religion, see Stephen B. Presser, Recapturing the Constitution: Race, Religion,
and Abortion Reconsidered 42-49 (Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1994).
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World War II and the Cold War was motivated (primarily anyway) by national interest rather than by considerations of morality. Nor is morality central to our politics and attitudes.
Freedom and wealth are." (p. 155) Somehow I think Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and even Hamilton would have thought
that we were about something more. No doubt Posner's singleminded focus on "freedom and wealth" are part of what gives his
writing such clarity and power, but his critics have always wondered whether life wasn't about more than just free individuals
pursuing wealth maximization. 14
The American experiment in nationhood was surely concerned with the preservation of freedom, and the protection of
the rights of property, but these means were supposed to be in
the service of promoting virtue, 15 and advancing morality andreligion, even though, like Posner, most American legal academics
appear (I am tempted to say, "blissfully") unaware of this simple
truth. The goal of virtue in our leaders is not one to which Posner subscribes. (p. 165) "Americans," he tells us, "have reached
a level of political sophistication at which they can take in stride
the knowledge that the nation's political and intellectual leaders
are their peers, and not their paragons. The nation does not depend on the superior virtue of one man." (p. 266) Posner thus
appears to believe in the gradual evolutionary unfolding of sophistication in the American people's exercise of sovereignty,
but I don't believe we've ever surpassed the "political sophistication" of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay writing in The Federalist, 16
and they were convinced that popular sovereignty could only
flourish in America if the President possessed the kind of virtue
and integrity that meant that he could be trusted with great
power. 17
There is another curious inconsistency in Posner's views
about what we ought to expect of the President, and to what extent we have a right to inquire into his private life, or to compel
him to submit to the Courts in a civil suit. A President, Posner
seems to suggest, is really just another regular guy, no different
14. For the most pungent criticism of Posner on this point sec Arthur Allen Leff,
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451 (1974).
15. See Presser, Recapturing the Constitution (cited in note 13), and sources there
cited.
16. See, e.g., Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, The Federalist Papers 75-76 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987), making the point that Ointon Rossiter believed that The Federalist was
the "one great American contribution to the world's literature on politics," and quoting
other commentators to the same effect.
17. See Presser, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (cited in note 8).
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from the rest of us. Thus, Posner's summation of what can now
be gainsaid about both the President and his detractors from this
"Affair of State," is that "We have learned that powerful, intelligent, articulate, well-educated, and successful people who
would like us to submit to their leadership whether political or
intellectual are, much of the time, fools, knaves, cowards, and
blunderers, just like the rest of us." They are "ordinary people,
with all the ordinary vices .... " (p. 265) In particular, Posner
writes that after L'Affaire Lewinsky, it is now "difficult to take
Presidents seriously, as superior people, for the same reason that
an even greater novel, The Remembrance of Things Past, made it
impossible by dint of its riveting detail to take aristocrats seriously as superior people." (p. 266) Proust may not be a particularly good authority for Posner here; Evelyn Waugh for one,
believed that Proust never really got close to the real aristocrats
in France, and was actually writing about second-raters. 18 But if
Posner is right about Presidents, at least, isn't it bizarre for him
repeatedly to suggest that a pragmatist (of which Posner claims
to be one) should have been able to work out a way for Clinton
to be above the law during his incumbency?
"I don't think it is monarchical," writes Posner "to suggest
that a President should be entitled to a uniquely generous exercise of prosecutorial discretion in his favor- so generous, indeed,
as to excuse him from being prosecuted for criminal behavior
committed before or during his term of office that could not reasonably be described as monstrous. Would not the disgrace of
being labeled a criminal by a censure resolution be punishment
enough for such a lofty figure? The fall from grace is greater,
the higher the altitude from which the fall begins." (p. 194)
Which is it, then, an "ordinary person," who presumably should
be subject to the law, like everyone else, or "a lofty figure," for
whom special rules should be applied? More troubling still,
Posner's "lofty figure" is supposed to be capable of shame, and
the shame is supposed to be punishment, but, as Posner himself
understands, Bill Clinton is uniquely incapable of shame.
Or again, perhaps projecting the Posnerian world-view on
the American people, the Judge states that Americans are not
Kantian in their regard for the rule of law, but rather they are
"prepared to allow that a President may be a little above the law,
18. I've combed my bookshelves for a citation here, so far without success. I think I
read it once in a book review by Gore Vidal in the New York Review of Books. Thank
God we can take a bit of license in book reviews.
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that felonies can be excused when they seem the harmless consequence of human weaknesses that should never have been a
subject of legal proceedings, that prosecutorial excess can mitigate a defendant's guilt, and that pragmatic considerations
should bear heavily on the decision whether to force a President
from office." (p. 230) But what if being "a little above the law"
is like being a little pregnant? The pragmatic Posner skates a bit
too close, for my taste, to dispensing with justice and the rule of
law altogether. To be entirely fair to Posner, he does recognize
that some chastisement of the President was called for. "[T]he
American public, he notes, "wants some punishment for
[Clinton's] actions," it wants, he continues, "a balance between
the kind of legal rigorism advocated by the Republican critics of
the President and the alarmingly free-wheeling 'equitable' or
even populist concept of justice advocated by the most extreme
of his defenders." (p. 230) Endorsing what he claims the public
wants, Posner claims that "[w]e might call that balance 'pragmatism."' (p. 230) It seems to me, though, that this "balance," purportedly desired by the American people, but clearly preferred
by Posner, might just as easily be called "Holmesian legal realism," or "total discretion," or even "tyranny." Is it so clear that
there is an acceptable middle ground here? Perhaps it is only a
matter of faith or historical tradition, and rigorous argument
cannot yield scientific or even pragmatic truth, but perhaps
sometimes extremism in the defense of the rule of law is no vice,
and moderation in allowing some to be above the law is no virtue.
In the end, the pragmatic Posner is able to conclude that
Clinton should not have been made to pay with his job because
the Supreme Court erred in allowing Paula Jones to pursue what
he regards as an essentially frivolous claim, a claim spearheaded
by the President's political enemies. Posner is only able to make
that argument because of his belief that the President's peccadilloes were private in nature, without a public dimension. (pp.
148-49) But even Posner himself concedes that he may go too
far here. Posner observes that the President's private conduct
(in engaging in perjury, obstruction of justice and the slandering
of his opponents) was inexcusable, but still one could be a "private monster but a public saint." (p. 173) And thus private conduct should not be allowed to drive a person the American people believe is an effective public official from office. And yet,
Posner makes the best argument for obliterating this idea: "But
if I am wrong about this [notion that one can separate public
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from private character], then the inference from private to public
conduct cannot reasonably be confined to cases in which the private conduct is a particularly heinous crime." (p. 173) As he
suspects, Posner is wrong about this, and thus a President who
can, with impunity, lie before a judge, a grand jury, and the
American people about having sexual relations with "that
woman, Ms. Lewinsky," is uniquely capable of ignoring other legal mandates.
Posner repeatedly blames the Supreme Court for failure to
understand that it should not have allowed the Paul Jones lawsuit to proceed, and blames the Independent Counsel Law, (and
the Court's upholding of that law) for the President's troubles,
and by implication for the wrenching "Affair of State," through
which the nation suffered. A Supreme Court bench composed
of Justice Posners would not have made that mistake and the
President would not have been put in an excruciating position.
For after all, "Clinton acted under considerable provocationperhaps provocation so considerable that few people in comparable circumstances would not succumb-in stepping over the line
that separates the concealment of embarrassing private conduct
from obstruction of legal justice." (p. 174) If the Supreme Court
had decided the Paula Jones case the other way, Posner assures
us, "there would have been no occasion for President Clinton to
obstruct justice while he was President." (p. 218) But this is a
post hoc propter hoc fallacy of a kind of which I would have
thought Judge Posner, pragmatist or no pragmatist, incapable.
The Judge focuses on Paula Jones, and forgets that the Clinton
administration has managed to generate more scandals per
square inch than any other Presidency since that of U.S. Grant.
After all, the Independent Counsel Act may well have been a
mistake, but it was the Whitewater investigation, Travelgate, the
Rose Law Firm Billing Records, etc. etc. that put Ken Starr in
business, not Paula Jones. Lewinsky, who was called as a deposition witness in the Jones case," only became part of his investigation when it looked as if Vernon Jordan may have attempted to
buy Lewinsky's silence (presumably aiding the President) in the
same manner he may have operated as a go-between for Webster Hubbell. 19 Had Paula Jones never existed, instead of believing that the President would have never obstructed justice,

19. For the details here see the Starr Report, H.R. Doc. No. 105-310 (Referral from
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr in Conformity With the Requirements of Title 28,
United States Code, Section 595(c)).
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one might just as easily believe the President would have invented another excuse to do it.
Posner bends over backwards to be even-handed (if I may
be forgiven an egregious and twisted mixed metaphor), and it
looks to me like he snaps. Take, for instance, his confident assurance that "[o]ne just knows that if the shoe were on the other
foot-if everything were the same except that the President was
a Republican-the Republicans would have denounced the investigation in the same terms that the Democrats used. And
with perfect sincerity." (p. 91, emphasis Posner's) But one just
doesn't know that. (Emphasis mine) When Republicans are
trapped in scandal, they may denounce investigations, but it's
not in the same terms, they don't fight on shamelessly, and instead, guilt-ridden, they resign, as did Nixon, Gingrich, and
Livingston. Republicans don't stage defiant pep rallies at the
White House after their man is impeached; they slink back
home. There are differences between the parties. The Republicans, particularly the House Managers, though they may have
been poor tacticians,20 were fighting for a solid cause grounded in
morality and the rule of law, perhaps even against their longterm political interest, while the Democrats, knowing they had
no legal case, outrageously pressed claims they knew to be without merit, and played every devious political card in the deck.
As Posner puts it, "[The President's lawyer David] Kendall gave
no impression of believing what he was saying. [His colleague,
Charles] Ruff, the better actor, gave a convincing impersonation
of a person who believes what he is saying. The lawyers made
the Senate Chamber an echo chamber of the President's untruths." (p. 246)
And so, in the end, I still don't buy into Posner's evenhandedness and pragmatism. Perhaps the difference between us
is that he's a Circuit Judge, above the fray, a happy and lucky
man, in full command of stunning descriptive powers. I read
Posner, and I feel a bit like Solieri listening to Mozart. I wish I
could deliver such lethal blows to my fellow academics as Posner
effortlessly tosses at Clintonphiles Alan Dershowitz, {p. 216)
Ronald Dworkin, (p. 238) Bruce Ackerman, (p. 129) or Sean
20. That's what Posner says, anyway; and, in particular, he thinks the House Managers blew it because they were not politically correct enough. Posner believes that it
was a mistake for the House Managers to parade before the Senate a large number of
Christian White Males, and that they would have done better to be more like the White
House, which fielded a team of lawyers including persons who were physically challenged, female, Jewish and Black. (p. 253)
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Wilentz (pp. 235-36). I wish I could have, within a year after the
event, assimilated thousands of pages of raw data, and produced
a highly readable account, which has the virtue of giving each
side its due, clearly staking out a position in the middle (albeit an
untenable one, I think), and grounding it all in a legal philosophy
that, if problematic, is at least brilliantly limned, and of which
Holmes would have been envious.
I wish I were as Olympian, but then again, maybe I don't.
Posner is fair enough in his treatment so that the virtue and even
the nobility of the impeachment effort can still be discerned,
even if it is not highlighted. And Posner's even-handedness is
particularly useful when employed to do things like rescuing
Judge Starr from the obloquy to which the Clintonistas subjected
him. (p. 69) Still, for Posner, "[a]bout all that can be said is that
moral rigorist would be inclined to think that the President
committed impeachable offenses, while a pragmatist would lean,
though perhaps only slightly, the other way." (p. 187) But more,
much more can be said. I don't pretend to objectivity here. I
was called as an impeachment witness before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution by the Republicans, I
think they were right, 21 and I think Henry Hyde, to whom Posner
gives rather short shrift,22 was superb to invoke my testimony as
authority in his speech opening the floor debate on impeachment. Said Hyde, quoting Presser, "Impeachable offenses are
those which demonstrate a fundamental betrayal of public trust.
They suggest the federal official has deliberately failed in his
duty to uphold the Constitution and laws he was sworn to enforce."23 No hint of Posnerian pragmatism there, just pure Kantian morality and the Rule of Law. It's good enough for Hyde,
and it's good enough for me. It was right to impeach the President, and he should have been convicted and removed. Fiat justica, ruat coelum.

21. In what follows I wallow in the reviewer's prerogative of implying that the
author should have paid more attention to the reviewers' work. I also fault Posner for
not giving any consideration to the testimony offered by my fellow witnesses Gary
McDowell, John McGinnis, and Jonathan Turley, all three of whose efforts suggest Posner is a bit too quick to characterize the academic testimony offered as shallow. (p. 218)
See generally the pieces cited in note 8.
22. See, e.g., p. 208, where Posner accuses Hyde of hypocrisy in defending Oliver
North's obstruction of justice and attacking Ointon's. Posner gives the impression of
believing that Hyde is an insufficiently pragmatic Puritan and an unthinking zealot. I
disagree. I think Hyde showed considerable courage in battling against insurmountable
political odds, particularly in the Senate, where the deck was clearly stacked against him.
23. Henry Hyde. speech before the full House, December 18, 1998.

